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Test-based Accountability Systems: Concerns 
for Indiana’s Multilingual Learners and Their 
Teachers
KATIE BROOKS,
Butler University
BROOKE KANDEL-CISCO,
Butler University
Indiana’s current test-based accountability system grew, in part, 
out of decades of federal-level educational reform initiatives. 
This article reviews the history of Indiana’s test-based 
accountability system for schools and details how the system 
calculates evaluative ratings for Indiana teachers and schools. 
Additionally, the article analyzes how the Indiana accountability 
system contradicts what is known about appropriate measurement 
of English language learners and lists psychometric and validity 
concerns such as valid assessment, non-random assignment, 
norming groups, and ceiling/bottom effects.   This article calls 
for a system in which multiple assessments offer rich data for 
school and teacher evaluations.
Keywords: accountability, teacher evaluation, English  
 learners
The past several years have been marked by rapid change in Indiana 
education policy.  Stakeholders at all levels including children, parents, 
teachers, and administrators have been affected by changes in standards, 
testing, evaluation, and public school funding to name a few.  In this 
article, we seek to outline changes in Indiana’s education accountability 
systems and highlight how those changes intersect with what is 
known about appropriate measurement of English language learners. 
Additionally, we describe how changes in the accountability system 
influence ELLs in Indiana.  
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While the terms English language learner or English learner seem to be 
the most widely understood and used term to describe a student who is 
learning English as a second or subsequent language, we purposefully 
use the term Multilingual Learner to describe these same students. 
We believe the term Multilingual Learner (ML) better reflects the rich 
linguistic capacity of students who are learning English. As of 2013, 
Indiana’s K-12 population includes 54, 054 MLs representing over 263 
languages. Approximately 63% of Indiana’s MLs were born in the U.S., 
while the other 37% are immigrants to the U.S. (Indiana Department of 
Education, 2014a).  Past trends suggest Indiana will continue to educate 
increasing numbers of MLs over the next years (U.S. DOE, 2013). 
When educators of MLs in Indiana understand and can anticipate how 
current education policy will affect MLs, we are better able to advocate 
for students, our profession, and as educators.
Indiana’s Test-Based Educational Accountability System
History of the system
Indiana’s current test based accountability system grew, in part, out 
of decades of federal-level educational reform initiatives. Educational 
reform attempts to improve schools through changes in the way they 
are organized and function day-to-day.  Modern educational reform is 
often traced to the 1983 publication, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative 
for Education Reform. This document suggests that America is “at-risk” 
of being unable to compete in the world economic marketplace because 
the current system of education is inadequate. More recently, No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), enacted in Indiana in 2002, sets the 
goal of improving classroom instruction through
•	 Stronger accountability for results
•	 Research-based education methods
•	 More choices for parents (NCLB, 2002)
While NCLB has been criticized for expanding curricula of test 
preparation and increasing high-stakes testing, NCLB offered some 
mandates that heightened the profile of MLs in K-12 schools.  For 
example, prior to NCLB schools were able to essentially ignore MLs 
because data were not available on specific ML education outcomes. 
Under NCLB, however, schools were required to disaggregate 
standardized test data for the ML sub-group and to show that the 
27Test-based Accountability Systems
schools were making progress in providing education (as measured by 
standardized test) to MLs.  No longer could MLs be ignored in distant 
portable classrooms and whisked away to a special teacher. The NCLB 
mandated accountability surrounding the education of MLs resulted in 
increased funding, professional development, and general educational 
attention that had the potential to benefit the K-12 ELL population 
(Clewell, Cosentino de Cohen, & Murray, 2007).
A Nation at Risk (1983) and NCLB (2002) have been catalysts 
for discussions about and changes in education in the U.S. Under 
NCLB 100% of students needed to attain grade level proficiency in 
mathematics and reading by 2014; schools failing to attain these goals 
faced strenuous federal and state sanctions. The 100% proficiency 
goal was set because to set expectations any lower meant our system 
was intentionally leaving some children behind. While a goal of grade 
level proficiency for all students is noble, the 100% target was a drastic 
departure from historical student proficiency trends on standardized tests 
(Welner, 2005).  Robert Linn (2004), then a researcher at the University 
of Colorado, examined trend data from the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) to document the extent to which NCLB 
100% proficiency requirements were unlikely to be met.  Linn found 
for eighth grade students, for example, “the rate of improvement in the 
percentage of students at the proficient level or above in mathematics 
would need to be 6.5 times as rapid between 2003 and 2014 as it was 
between 2000 and 2003” (p. 3).  Linn and others (e.g., Abedi & Dietel, 
2004; Welner, 2004;) predicted the rapid growth in proficiency required 
by NCLB was unrealistic and the goal was unattainable.
Because the 100% proficiency goal was unattainable, the U.S. 
Department of Education eventually allowed states to apply for an 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) flexibility waiver 
from NCLB if they agreed to enact an approved school accountability 
plan. As of August 2014, 43 states have received waivers and, at the time 
of this writing, an additional two states are in the process of developing 
an alternative accountability plan and seeking approval from the U.S. 
Department of Education.  The Indiana Department of Education (IDOE) 
applied for and received one of these waivers in 2012 (U.S. DOE, 
2012).  As part of the waiver application, the IDOE proposed replacing 
the NCLB school evaluation model with a new school evaluation model 
that interprets standardized test scores in terms of status and growth 
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(U.S. Department of Education, 2014).  In August of 2014, the IDOE’s 
NCLB waiver was renewed by the U.S. Department of Education (U.S. 
DOE, 2014).
Components of the Indiana Accountability System
Student-level Standardized Tests
Indiana’s test-based accountability system includes multiple components. 
The cornerstone of the system, however, consists of student scores on 
state standardized tests.  Currently, Indiana students are required to take a 
litany of tests during their K-12 educational career including the Indiana 
Statewide Testing for Educational Progress Plus (ISTEP+) primarily in 
language arts and mathematics, but also in science and social studies. 
Third graders must also take the IREAD-3 and high school students must 
sit for End of Course Assessments (ECAs) in English 10, Algebra 1, and 
Biology 1.  MLs are further required to be assessed yearly to measure 
their growth in and attainment of English proficiency using the LAS 
Links with scores used for schools Annual Measurable Achievement 
Objectives (AMAOs).  
Teacher Evaluation System
The 2012-13 school year was the first year in which teachers were 
evaluated under the stipulations of legislation passed in 2011.  While 
the legislation did not mandate a particular evaluation system, the law 
did set certain parameters for teacher evaluation. Under Indiana law, 
each teacher is rated as ineffective, needing improvement, effective, 
highly effective (Cole, Murphy, Rogan, & Eakes, 2013).  The rating 
calculation must consider student standardized test scores; only teachers 
rated in the top two categories are eligible to receive a pay raise (Indiana 
Department of Education, 2011).   Teachers in the lowest two categories 
are subject to sanctions such as immediate or eventual dismissal.  The 
Indiana Legislature provided no specific guidance on how ESL teachers 
or other support personnel should be evaluated.
A-F School Ratings 
Public Law 221 (P.L. 221) is Indiana’s K-12 accountability system.  P.L. 
221 was passed by the state legislature in 1999, and mandates that public 
and accredited non-public schools are placed into one of five categories 
based on results from ISTEP+ and End-of-Course Assessments (IDOE, 
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nd). Under P.L. 221, Indiana schools have long received accountability 
scores, but a new iteration of the P.L. 221 accountability system, known 
as A-F, was approved both by the Indiana State Board of Education and 
the U.S. Department of Education in February of 2012.  This new A-F 
system allowed Indiana to receive a waiver from the adequate yearly 
progress requirement of NCLB Act.  In effect, the U.S. Department of 
Education’s waiver approval gave Indiana flexibility in implementing 
NCLB Act requirements in exchange for an accountability system (A-F) 
that was focused on increasing student achievement (U.S. DOE, 2012). 
While the NCLB Act relied on a status model for evaluating 
school improvement, Indiana’s A-F uses a percentile growth model 
in addition to the status model. Status models measure the percentage 
of students that pass a state standardized test while the growth models 
consider how much students grow in performance on standardized 
tests either in relationship to content knowledge or their peers (Gong, 
Perie, & Dunn, 2006). In Indiana, public schools, accredited non-public 
schools, and schools that accept school vouchers are assessed by the 
A-F percentile growth model grading system.  Elementary and middle 
schools are evaluated on growth and performance while high schools are 
evaluated on improvement, performance, and graduation rates (Hiller, 
DiTommaso, & Plucker, 2012).
Under the plan proposed by the IDOE, Indiana schools will be 
evaluated using a combination of the status and growth models, with 
the growth model focusing on how students grow in comparison to 
their peers. Growth modeling has been used in US schools since 1992 
when Tennessee started using value added assessment to evaluate 
school districts. Two forms of growth models are typically used for 
accountability purposes in U.S. schools: a value added model and a 
percentile growth model.  Value-added models have been used most 
extensively and for the greatest number of years.  The exact variables 
considered with these models vary across time and state.  These models 
may consider factors such as family income levels, race, ethnicity, 
language status, gender, and student mobility (Franco & Seidel, 2012). 
The value added model measures how student test scores change from 
year to year or over multiple years. These gains in test scores are then 
used to evaluate teacher and/or school performance.
Percentile growth modeling is the latest iteration of growth 
modeling used for educational accountability.  Betebenner (2009) has 
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identified two main assumptions underlying this model: a) past student 
performance serves as a strong predictor of future student performance 
and b) high quality schools and teachers are better at facilitating growth 
in standardized test scores than low quality schools and teachers. 
Percentile growth modeling presents a shift in the conceptualization of 
student growth. Previous iterations of growth modeling were criterion-
referenced.  In other words, these models were focused only on how 
students grew in their achievement in relationship to a certain set of 
criteria: the state academic standards. 
Percentile growth modeling adds a normative component to 
this growth modeling by comparing how much of an increase a student 
has on standardized test scores in comparison to students at similar 
levels of achievement (Betebenner, 2009).  For example, if a group of 
students all have a third grade standardized test scaled score of 350, 
their growth on a standardized test will be compared with each other. 
If a particular student from this group scores significantly higher than 
her peers on the fourth grade test, she will be considered to have high 
growth in comparison to her scale score peers.  Conversely, if she scores 
significantly lower than her peers on the fourth grade test, she will be 
considered to have low growth in comparison to her scale score peers. 
Adding the normative component to the growth modeling addresses 
concerns expressed by researchers questioning the vertical scaling of 
content for criterion-referenced standardized assessments in which the 
standards for grade levels change from year to year (Amrein-Beardsley, 
2008).  Instead of comparing scores for tests that are often based on 
different standards, this normative growth model compares students. 
School scores will show the median growth scores of all the students 
in the school in comparison to all the students who completed the test.
Indiana’s student percentile growth model considers the growth 
of each student independent of his or her school.  The analysis uses 
quantile regression analysis which will show a relationship between a 
student’s previous test scores and predicted growth in test scores in the 
subsequent year of testing.  Students are grouped (also called blocking) 
by percentiles or quantiles, of standardized test scaled scores into four 
different groups:
1. High achieving/high growth
2. High achieving/low growth
3. Low achieving/high growth
4. Low achieving/low growth
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Then the student’s growth is compared to students in their same quantile 
group, considered their academic peer group, using growth percentiles. 
Students are compared to other students in his or her academic peer 
group for up to three previous years when these data are available for the 
student.  Target growth is set for each academic peer group based on the 
group’s growth trajectory, and students will be rated as high, average, or 
low growth depending on how well they perform.  The target percentile 
growth will change from year to year depending on the academic peer 
group performance on standardized tests.  A teacher’s and a school’s 
growth scores are calculated based on the average growth of students in 
the class or school.
Concerns with the System: Multilingual Learners, 
Their Teachers, & Their Schools
Does Test-based Accountability Improve Educational Outcomes?
The primary concern for using test-based accountability system is that 
there is no evidence that using student test scores as part of teacher 
and school evaluation systems results in higher student achievement. 
In fact, according to the National Research Council, high-stakes testing 
and accountability when measured by national measures for more than 
a decade have produced little to no impact on student achievement, 
despite great cost and emphasis (Hout & Elliot, 2011).  Furthermore, 
in international comparisons, US 15 year olds maintained their relative 
standing to other countries in reading and significantly decreased in 
math from 2000-2009, the years of high stakes testing accountability 
under NCLB (OECD, 2010).  
Validity Issues Related to Indiana’s Accountability System
The primary cause of the problems with using standardized test scores 
to evaluate teachers and schools is the validity of the tests, especially 
when they are used with ML students.  A valid measure assesses what 
the evaluators believe that it is testing. Without validity, standardized 
test scores, teacher evaluations, and school A-F grades are meaningless 
because they are not measuring what the evaluators think they are 
measuring.  In the next section, we present a few reasons that explain 
why the use of standardized tests for student, teacher, and school level 
evaluations and high-stakes decisions is invalid for students in general 
but also for ML students specifically.
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 Non-random assignment. One of the principles of high quality 
empirical research is that when comparing different groups, the groups 
should either be randomly assigned or should have highly similar 
characteristics. Comparing schools is difficult at best.  Students are 
not randomly assigned to schools, and schools vary greatly in terms of 
available resources and student demographics and characteristics. This 
non-random assignment of students to schools and the vast differences 
in student populations between schools present a significant bias when 
making cross-school comparisons (Schochet & Chiang, 2010).  MLs in 
Indiana, for example, tend to be clustered in particular schools and school 
corporations.  According to the IDOE, only 27 out of almost 300 Indiana 
school corporations reported a Limited English Proficient population of 
at least 10% of the total student body (IDOE, 2014b).  Furthermore, even 
within the ML student subpopulation, the demographic composition of 
the ML students at different schools can vary widely.  For example, 
one school may have a large number of ML students whose parents 
are managers and executives for an automotive manufacturer and 
receive extensive tutoring outside of school, while other schools may 
have large numbers of ML students who are refugees with significant 
interrupted formal schooling.  While these concentrations of MLs might 
allow schools to pool instructional resources and language programs, 
the concentrations are further evidence that comparing schools based 
on test scores as if all schools are equal is erroneous.  In other words, 
Indiana schools serving MLs are not homogenous and student data from 
those schools should be interpreted in light of the specific complexities 
of each school population.
 Standardized tests do not measure teacher quality. Multiple 
factors influence student performance on standardized tests.  Betebenner 
(2009) is one of the developers of Indiana’s test-based accountability 
system. The assumptions that Betebenner (2009) used in developing 
Indiana’s A-F accountability system have serious validity issues and 
flaws in logic. His first assumption was that high quality schools and 
teachers are better at facilitating growth in standardized test scores than 
low quality schools and teachers.  By stating this assumption, Betebenner 
implied that standardized test scores are a valid measure of teacher and 
school quality.  However, this assertion is contrary to almost 50 years 
of extensive research on the impact of teachers and schools on student 
achievement.  These studies indicate that typically 7-10% of variability 
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in student performance on standardized tests is attributable to teacher 
and school level factors (Coleman, 1966, Heubert & Hauser, 1999; 
Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 1998; Schochet & Chiang, 2010). According 
to the American Statistical Association, more recent studies focused on 
basing teacher and school evaluation on student growth shows that only 
1-14% of student test score growth can be attributed to teachers (ASA, 
2014).  Non-school variables such as  (1) low birth-weight and non-
genetic prenatal influences on children; (2) inadequate medical, dental, 
and vision care, often a result of inadequate or no medical insurance; 
(3) food insecurity; (4) environmental pollutants; (5) family relations 
and family stress; and (6) neighborhood characteristics (Berliner, 2009, 
p. 1), exert a much greater influence on student achievement than do 
school-related factors. 
 The most prominent non-school factors that influence ML 
student achievement include language differences, parent education 
level, previous experience with schooling, length of time in U.S. 
schools, cultural and acculturation issues, and native language literacy 
development (Abedi, 2002; DeCapua & Marshall, 2010; Garcia & Frede, 
2010).  Even the developers of the Indiana test-based accountability 
system acknowledge that teachers who have large numbers of ML 
students will likely have low growth scores on standardized tests (Diaz-
Bilello & Briggs, 2014).   Due to weaknesses in connecting student 
standardized test scores to teacher and school evaluations, the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences considers value-
added measures of teacher effectiveness “too unstable to be considered 
fair or reliable” (Heubert & Hauser, 1999) and the American Statistical 
Association (2014) calls the statistical underpinning of the system 
“unstable,” even under ideal conditions, due to its large error rates.  
Characteristics of the multilingual learner. For MLs, the 
validity of using standardized test scores as a measurement of school 
effectiveness, or even student learning, is questionable. The test-based 
accountability system assumes the results of state standardized content 
tests can be interpreted as valid measures of MLs content knowledge. 
For example, it is assumed that a standardized test of grade level 
mathematics content will show the extent to which a student knows 
and can demonstrate the mathematics content.  Yet, this assumption 
ignores other factors, unrelated to mathematics content, which the test 
is actually measuring.  MLs are, by definition, in the process of learning 
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English, including academic English.  When an ML takes a standardized 
mathematics test, that test is measuring not only the student’s mastery of 
the mathematics, but is also measuring -and perhaps is mostly measuring- 
the student’s ability to understand the academic English of the test. 
Certain types of English language that often appear on standardized 
tests and contribute to construct-irrelevant variance include unfamiliar 
vocabulary, culturally bound idiomatic language, confusing syntax like 
double negatives, morphologically complex words, and long sentences 
with multiple clauses and passive voice (Abedi, 2002; Young, 2008).
Norming group. The norming groups used to make comparisons 
amongst quantiles present another psychometric issue.  Norm 
referenced interpretation of test results means that one student’s scores 
will be compared against the scores of the “norming group,” a group of 
students’ who have already taken the same test.  Inappropriate norming 
groups are known to substantially affect the validity of outcomes 
on standardized tests (American Educational Research Association 
[AERA], 1999).  This means that a standardized test developed for 
one group of students is not necessarily valid for a different group 
of students.  Standardized test results for a student who is a ML, for 
example, should be interpreted with caution if the norming group on 
which the percentile ranks were constructed did not include English 
learners.  In A-F, the state will not disaggregate sub-groups and will 
indeed use cross sub-group comparisons to establish a letter grade for 
schools.  Thus, the growth of a ML will be compared to a norming group 
not necessarily composed of MLs and, thus, the factors that uniquely 
affect MLs (i.e., language development, cultural differences, prior 
educational differences, etc.) will not be considered. The AERA’s and 
National Council on Measurement in Education’s joint Standards for 
Educational and Psychological Testing (1999), for example, note that 
“norms based on native speakers of English either should not be used 
with individuals whose first language is not English or such individuals’ 
test results should be interpreted as reflecting in part current level of 
English proficiency rather than ability, potential, aptitude or personality 
characteristics or symptomatology” (p. 91). 
Invalid measures of learning.  Indiana’s test-based 
accountability system, including the growth model components of the 
system, is grounded in student performance on standardized tests, yet 
standardized tests offer a limited, and often  invalid, measure of student 
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learning.  Indiana’s academic standards are, in the words of the IDOE 
“world-class standards” that support students in becoming college and 
career ready (IDOE, nd).  Unfortunately, the high stakes standardized 
tests purported to measure student mastery of those standards fail to 
fully assess the rich student learning that occurs in Indiana classrooms. 
The American Statistical Association (2014) highlighted this issue in a 
recent report: 
Ideally, tests should fully measure student achievement 
with respect to the curriculum objectives and content 
standards adopted by the state, in both breadth and depth. 
In practice, no test meets this stringent standard, and it 
needs to be recognized that, at best, most VAMs [value 
added measures] predict only performance on the test 
and not necessarily long-range learning outcomes. Other 
student outcomes are predicted only to the extent that 
they are correlated with test scores. A teacher’s efforts 
to encourage students’ creativity or help colleagues 
improve their instruction, for example, are not explicitly 
recognized in VAMs (np).  
In other words, standardized tests only measure a small segment of the 
content and processes students learn in relation to a particular standard 
and these tests do little to help us understand a student’s long-term 
mastery of the standard.
Ceiling and bottom effects.  In addition to norming issues, the 
growth of the highest and lowest performing students in the proposed 
A-F system is particularly concerning, due to phenomena called the 
ceiling effect and the bottom effect. The ceiling effect refers to the 
tendency for a high performing student’s test score growth to be smaller 
than average because the student’s initial score already approaches the 
highest score possible.  In the A-F system, this would be a student whose 
initial test score falls near the top of the highest quantile.  These high 
performing students have little room to grow based on the standardized 
test score, and thus, these students and the schools in which they are 
enrolled could be misconstrued as low performing.  A bottoming out 
effect, in contrast, affects students whose test scores fall near the lowest 
scores possible, or in the A-F system, near the bottom of the lowest 
36 ITJ, 2014, Volume 11, Number 1
quantile.  These low performing students could show substantial growth 
based on standardized test scores, yet because they began so low within 
the quantile, their test performance could still be considered to be 
insufficient compared to other students whose initial scores were in the 
upper scores of the quantile. This issue disproportionately affects MLs, 
especially those MLs just beginning to learn English due to the fact 
that standardized tests in academic English are often not linguistically 
accessible for MLs.   Thus, the scores of beginning MLs tend to fall 
within the bottom of the lowest quantile and the language background 
of MLs adds another source of error in test-based accountability systems 
(Abedi, 2002). Schools with high numbers of high performing students, 
low performing students, or high numbers of MLs are likely to receive 
artificially low grades. 
Consequences
An additional group of concerns involves the consequences of the A-F 
accountability system for schools.  Many prominent educational experts 
have spoken out against the misuse of standardized test scores and their 
impact on children.  These concerns include impacts on student learning 
and equity issues.  
Narrowing of the curriculum
The heavy emphasis on standardized testing over the past decade has 
led to a narrowing of the curriculum to a focus on low-level basic skills 
(Hout & Elliot, 2011).  In order to keep their jobs when test scores 
determine teacher evaluations, teachers often choose or are required to 
focus on test preparation.  Furthermore, most schools that are facing 
sanctions because of high stakes testing have adopted pre-packaged, 
teacher-proof test preparation programs.  This focus on test preparation 
often greatly limits or eliminates curricula rich in critical and creative 
thinking skills (Jones, 1999; Jones et al., 2004). MLs in particular 
need rich and relevant curricula that will support academic language 
development. MLs are under pressure to simultaneously learn content 
(mathematics, history, etc.) while also learning academic language.  A 
rich and relevant curriculum allows MLs to make connections between 
the content and their own life experiences and provides MLs multiple 
entry points for learning academic language. 
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Disproportional Impact on High Poverty Schools
Disproportional impact on high poverty schools is an additional concern 
under the current growth model.  According to Franco and Seidel (2012), 
value added models appear stable for schools that reflect the average 
demographics for a state.  However, for schools that vary significantly 
in their student characteristics, significant reliability issues arise in using 
value-added measures for accountability purposes. Scott Elliott (2012), 
a reporter at the Indianapolis Star, examined the impact of the growth 
model accountability system on Indiana schools.  He found that
For the state’s largest high-poverty districts, huge percentages 
of their schools would see their grades go down — 44 percent in 
IPS, 53 percent in Gary, 57 percent in Fort Wayne and 65 percent 
in Hammond. But large, wealthy districts had hardly any schools 
with grades that fell — zero in Carmel, zero in Zionsville, 12 
percent in Center Grove and 20 percent in Hamilton Southeastern.
Franco and Seidel’s warnings about the disproportionate impact of 
growth models on high poverty and schools with diverse student 
populations are manifested in Indiana schools. This disparity is further 
highlighted in Elliot’s description of what is happening to School 46 in 
Indianapolis Public Schools:
Under the new system, School 46 would receive less credit for 
the good work it does to help students overcome their significant 
challenges — 91 percent of its students come from families 
poor enough to qualify for free or reduced-price lunches (annual 
income of less than $42,000 for a family of four). The school 
would earn a bonus for raising scores, but only enough to raise 
its grade to a C.
Despite the fact that School 46 is showing significant growth in student 
performance on state standardized tests, they would still be labeled as 
a C school.
The disproportionate impact of the A-F system on high poverty 
schools also affects MLs. Fry (2008) found that at the national level, the 
schools in which MLs are enrolled on average have greater proportions 
of students living in poverty than schools with no MLs. Furthermore, 
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large, urban school districts in Indiana tend to be accountable for more 
subgroups and ML students are often identified in multiple subgroups 
(Burke, DePalma, Ginther, Morita-Mullaney, & Young, 2014).  For 
example, in addition to being part of the limited English proficient 
(LEP) subgroup, a ML student might also be a part of the Hispanic 
and free/reduced lunch subgroups.  Inclusion in multiple subgroups 
magnifies the impact that ML students have on teacher, school, and 
district evaluations.
The growth model system dis-incentivizes high performing 
teachers from working in low performing schools and working with 
MLs. As stated in previous sections, since only about 7-10% variability 
in student performance of on achievement tests can be attributed 
to teacher and school level factors, the context of where a teacher 
teaches makes a huge impact on his or her students’ standardized test 
scores.  If teachers move from high to low performing schools, they 
risk lower teacher evaluations, increased criticism, more hostile work 
environments, lower moral, and possible job loss, not because they are 
ineffective teachers but that their students have other issues that impact 
their performance on standardized tests.  Under new teacher evaluation 
systems, teachers’ annual performance and salary increases depend, in 
part, on student standardized test scores.  
Shifting Resources Away
Indiana’s A-F accountability system is based on flawed science. When 
NCLB was initiated, it mandated that all educational decisions be based 
on the US Department of Education’s definition of scientifically-based 
research.  When the research did not end up supporting the political 
agenda of NCLB, policymakers ignored the research. Indiana’s 
accountability system is statistically complicated and complex enough 
that a layperson, a teacher, or a school administrator would likely be 
hard-pressed to understand how the system works in practice.
Using quantitative data and statistical models does not good science 
make. Hoping and believing that the Indiana status/growth models and 
punitive repercussions for student, teacher, and school evaluation are an 
effective way to ensure teacher effectiveness does not make the system 
valid and contradicts what statistical and behavioral science research 
show as good evaluation and accountability practice.   The time, 
effort, and money spent on the A-F system, which has proven to be an 
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ineffective lever for school accountability, is a great loss of opportunity 
for Indiana’s children, diverting attention away from research and 
development of policies that have much greater potential to improve 
education for all children.  
Conclusion
Indiana’s children deserve research-based approaches to educational 
evaluation, not a system based on erroneous assumptions and politics; 
Indiana tax payers deserve to have their tax dollars spent on effective 
policies that will have a positive impact on children, schools, and 
communities.  For more than a decade, the reward and punishment 
policies of standardized-test based accountability have been failed 
policies for MLs.  Continuing to implement the same system of rewards 
and punishment will not improve educational outcomes, especially for 
MLs.  For teacher and school evaluation systems to be useful tools in 
informing school improvement efforts, the data gathered and analyzed 
must be meaningful. The current use of the status and growth models is not 
measuring teacher and school effectiveness in a statistically significant 
way because other non-school related factors are influencing test score 
outcomes to a much greater extent than are school level factors.  These 
factors include, but are not limited to, language difference, cultural 
difference, and poverty-related factors for teacher and school quality. 
Punishing or firing educators and closing schools due to the test scores 
of their students is not going to address these underlying issues. Instead, 
policymakers need to find ways to provide more support for families 
and neighborhoods that are facing these challenges. Furthermore, we 
need to make high stakes decisions about educating our students based 
on multiple forms of assessments, including a much heavier emphasis 
on authentic and performance assessments.  
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